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THE AVOIDANCE CANON: FROM THE COLD
WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR
Lisa A. Kloppenberg*
Professor Bernard Bell poses two questions in his introduction to
this collection of essays. The first question is: Should judicial construction
of statutes be influenced by constitutional principles (and if so, how)? The
second question is: Are legislatures competent to resolve constitutional
questions and independently protect constitutionally based interests when
acting in constitutional areas?'
This essay presumes that it is not just the courts that wield the
responsibility and power of constitutional interpretation. Congress and state
legislatures, federal and state executive officers, police officers, public
school officials, local politicians, and many others also interpret the U.S.
Constitution in their daily work. The evolution of constitutional law affords
our divided system of democratic governance an opportunity for dialogue
among government officials and the electorate. Constitutional law should
be formulated in an ongoing, long-term dialogue in which judges,
legislators, and other constitutional actors participate actively in shaping our
evolving understanding of the Constitution's protections and limitations.2
This essay also presumes that each branch has a duty to protect
constitutionally based interests when acting in constitutional areas;
therefore, it first asks how judges use the avoidance canon to interpret
legislation to protect constitutionally based interests, and thereafter focuses
on the impact of such avoidance on constitutional dialogue.3 When courts
employ the avoidance canon, do they actually act in a less aggressive
manner and thereby promote deference to legislators? In addition, even if
avoidance allows a greater role for development of constitutional ideals by
other constitutional actors in the short run, does avoidance foster a vibrant,
long-term role for the judiciary as an independent interpreter of the
Constitution and adequately protect constitutional values? This essay
focuses on examples of the Supreme Court's review of legislative and
" Dean and Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law. I am grateful to my research
assistant, Cara Ziegelgruber (Class of 2007), and the editors of the Dayton Law Review, for their
excellent work and to Rich Saphire for helpful comments.
'The collection of essays arises from the Legislation Section panel at the American Association of
Law Schools Conference held January 6, 2006 in Washington, D.C. This particular essay also
draws extensively on my prior work, including, Lisa A Kloppenberg, Does Avoiding Constitutional
Questions Promote Judicial Independence? 56 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1031 (2006).
2 For further descriptions of constitutional dialogue, see sources cited in Lisa A. Kloppenberg,
Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 Ind. L.J. 297, 314-17 nn. 91-115 (1996).
3 See generally Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Playing It Safe (N.Y.U. Press 2001) [hereinafter
Kloppenberg, Safe].
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executive powers to deal with dissidents and terrorists during war time. It
contrasts the Warren Court's use of avoidance during the Cold War with the
Court's early rulings to challenges arising from the War on Terror.
I. THE AVOIDANCE CANON
The avoidance canon is a tool used to interpret statutes narrowly
when they raise "serious constitutional problems. 'A The canon is one
component of a broader avoidance doctrine, which urges judges to avoid
making decisions regarding "unnecessary" constitutional questions.5  It
encompasses a number of tools, including justiciability barriers and
abstention doctrines that bar courts from ruling on the merits of
constitutional issues. It also covers minimalist approaches and
constitutional decision-making if the merits of an issue are reached .
Sometimes constitutional rulings are merely delayed; at other times, they are
avoided. Many judges and scholars have praised avoidance as a way to
preserve judicial independence and promote deference to other
constitutional decision-makers.7 The Court has extolled the avoidance
doctrine as a foundational principle of constitutional adjudication for federal
courts. Many state courts employ similar presumptions regarding
avoidance.
The canon is premised in part on deference to the legislature's role
in constitutional interpretation. Rather than invalidating troubling
legislation, a court merely revises the offending aspect of the legislation. In
theory, this affords legislatures another opportunity to consider the
constitutional issues posed and to strike a different balance between
furthering its primary legislative aims and invading constitutionally
protected areas.
In practice, the avoidance canon is sometimes deployed with
considerable aggressiveness. Many scholars provide examples of the
contortions that can result from using this purportedly deferential canon.8
4 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
575 (1988). See Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Serious Constitutional Doubts: The Supreme
Court's Construction of Statutes Raising Free Speech Concerns, 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1 (1996)
(examining several groups of First Amendment cases from the Cold War era to the 1990s)
[hereinafter Kloppenberg, Constitutional Doubts].
5 Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1003, 1016-1124
(1994) (hereinafter Kloppenberg, Constitutional Questions].
6 See generally Kloppenberg, Safe, supra n. 3.
7See e.g. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1962)
[hereinafter Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch]; Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent (Yale
U. Press 1975); Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time (Harvard U. Press 1999); Hon. Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185 (1992); Hon. Richard A. Posner,
Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31 (2005).
8 See e.g. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1007 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1992); Phillip P. Frickey,
Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 397 (2005);
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Some courts have used the canon to create shadow or phantom
constitutional norms rather than enforce clear, existing precedent at the time
of the legislative enactment.9 Of course, a court's view of the scope of
constitutional protection will sometimes differ from the legislature's reading
of the Constitution. Where there is room for debate-as there often is in
constitutional interpretation-a court can use the canon to enforce its view
of the constitutional concerns, developing constitutional law through dicta
or on statutory interpretation grounds without clear demarcation of
constitutional boundaries.
In some circumstances, courts have used the canon to rewrite
statutes to contravene fairly clear legislative intent, thus undercutting the
law significantly without invalidating it. Courts essentially remand a
controversial law to the legislature. The legislature may not have the time
or political will to reconsider the issue. Thus, while the canon is advanced
as a rich mechanism for dialogue between courts and legislature on
constitutional issues, I have previously argued that the canon can be used as
a way of deciding constitutional issues on the merits without a full airing of
the issue, without sufficient reasoned elaboration, and without purporting to
rule on the merits.'0
After examining the justifications for the avoidance doctrine and
considering its costs, this essay contrasts the Warren Court's use of the
canon during the Cold War with the Court's emerging jurisprudence in the
War on Terrorism rulings. In the Cold War cases discussed below, the
Supreme Court used the canon to develop phantom norms, and to
subsequently chide governmental actors of the same era for not avoiding a
constitutional "danger zone so clearly marked" when the danger was only
identified as a potential constitutional problem in earlier precedent." The
approach was not deferential to other constitutional actors and I question
whether it was necessary to protect the Court's judicial independence. In
some early War on Terror cases the Court employed avoidance techniques,
but it has also addressed constitutional issues concerning the balance of
individual liberties and national security in other major challenges, even
finding that some of the executive practices violated the Constitution and
that suspected terrorists merited some constitutional protections. 12  The
Lawrence C. Marshall, Divesting the Courts: Breaking the Judicial Monopoly on Constitutional
Interpretation, 66 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 481 (1990); Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 Yale
L.J. 545 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 Sup. Ct. Rev. 71 (1995).
9 See Motomura, supra n. 8; Eskridge & Frickey, supra n. 8.
0 See generally Kloppenberg, Constitutional Doubts, supra n. 4.
"See e.g. Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957).
12 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (holding that a citizen-detainee's detention
was legally authorized and satisfied the requirement that a detention be "pursuant to an Act of
Congress" where the detainee was seized in Afghanistan and held in the U.S., although he was
entitled to receive notice of the factual basis for his classification as an enemy combatant and a fair
opportunity to rebut assertions before a neutral decision-maker); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126
S. Ct. 2749, 2758 (2006) (holding that a Yemeni national in custody at an American prison in
2007]
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Court apparently delivered these bold-perhaps even courageous-
decisions during wartime without experiencing significant backlash or loss
of viability.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AVOIDANCE AND ITS COSTS
Why have federal and state courts developed avoidance canons if
they pose the risks delineated above? The justifications for avoidance can
be grouped into a few categories based on Justice Brandeis's famous
Ashwander formulation of 1936.13 Perhaps the most understandable and
defensible justification is the proposition that federal courts should avoid
unnecessary constitutional questions to promote federalism and separation
of powers. Thus, to the extent Congress or a state is charged with authority
in a particular substantive area, courts should carefully ensure the ability of
these actors to interpret the Constitution in their work by not foreclosing
options. Judicial review that invalidates another branch's constitutional
work should be a last resort due to its purportedly delicate andfinal nature.
Similarly, states and other constitutional actors should be given the benefit
of the doubt whenever possible, and their actions repudiated only when
absolutely necessary.14
While deference is an important and valid stance for courts in our
multilayered democracy, it is not simple to apply. Additionally, executive
and legislative officials may sometimes fail to protect constitutional interests
of individuals, particularly in times when expedience is needed, majoritarian
political pressure is extreme, or when those seeking protection are viewed as
threats or enemies. The precise dictates of federalism and separation of
powers are not clear, making more difficult the judgment call about whether
lawsaying by a court is necessary. In addition to being vague and broad, the
constitutional interests in these areas change over time in response to
historical, political and social developments. For example, in recent
decades, federalism issues have emerged as major areas for power struggles
between the federal and state governments, businesses, and individuals, with
courts delineating the scope of these powers regularly and "mediating" these
struggles. 5 During the War on Terror, President George W. Bush and his
advisors have advanced a broad view of executive power that is not
completely shared by the Court, some legislators, and some of the polity.
While avoiding constitutional issues to afford time for political battles to
play out or crises to diminish may appear attractive, it entails costs for
parties who must spend excessive time and expense in determining and
Guantanamo Bay had no automatic right to review the military commission's decision before a
federal court under the Detainee Treatment Act, but that "an accused must, absent disruptive
conduct or consent, be present for his trial and must be privy to the evidence against him").
13 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (outlining several rules the Court
developed for avoiding constitutional questions).
14 The Ashwander justifications are explored more fully in Kloppenberg, Constitutional Questions,
supra n. 5, at 1035-65.
15 Kloppenberg, Safe, supra n. 3, at ch. 7 (discussing federalism rulings of the Rehnquist Court).
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securing protection for their constitutional rights.
Additionally, a court's invocation of an avoidance mechanism does
not always lead to greater deference to other constitutional actors or advance
constitutional dialogue. 16 Judge Posner has characterized Professor Bickel's
avoidance project as promoting a "coercive" kind of dialogue.' 7 "It would
be a Bickelian Court's hope that legislators' eyes would be opened by the
Court's tutorial or that reenactment would flounder because of the difficulty
of enacting legislation."' 8 In terms of promoting dialogue, the canon affords
less clarity as the Court shapes constitutional law. The Court could step
away from the ruling or alter the boundaries of the danger zone identified in
future cases. Professor Murchison has said the canon advances a rather
"muffled" and "tentative" dialogue, with a "blend of indirection, impatience,
pause and reply," but he nevertheless concludes that the canon is important
and useful.' 9
A second set of justifications for avoidance is even more troubling.
These concerns center on the pressure placed on courts resulting from
constitutional adjudication.20  They include a court's credibility and
viability, and are directly linked to fears for judicial independence. The
Ashwander formulation arose in part as a response to the activism of the
conservative U.S. Supreme Court of the Lochner era. The fears of political
reprisal and long-term credibility, or the viability of unelected Article III
judges certainly animate the general avoidance doctrine, as captured so well
in Bickel's work on the countermajoritarian difficulty and passive virtues.2'
These concerns can be exaggerated. Courts have thrived during
much of the last century, becoming increasingly important in constitutional
adjudication despite political attacks, funding battles, and other pressures.
Courts in the U.S., along with courts in other countries, have played a
significant role in the development of constitutional law-sometimes in
socially sensitive areas22-without much success by those who attempt to
curb courts' authority through jurisdiction-stripping laws, budget
restrictions, or other means (e.g., altering the size of the Supreme Court).
Courts have made numerous decisions regarding federalism, separation of
powers, criminal procedure, privacy rights, race and gender relations, sexual
orientation, and religion over the past century without diminishing
significantly in power or in public perception of credibility.
Even if fears regarding continued independence for the judiciary are
'6 See Schauer, supra n. 8.
17 Posner, supra n. 7, at 82.
" Id. at 82-83.
'9 Brian C. Murchison, Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance Canon in
Separation of Powers Cases, 30 Ga. L. Rev. 85, 169 (1995).
20 Kloppenberg, Constitutional Questions, supra n. 5, at 1031-32.
21 See generally Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch, supra n. 7.
22 See Judges in Contemporary Democracy (Robert Badinter & Hon. Stephen Breyer, eds., N.Y.U.
Press 2004) (examining the judiciary's role in supervision of the political process).
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more credible than assessed in this essay, judges play an important
constitutional role in checking the majoritarian impulses of other branches,
governments, or politicians, who are under greater pressure than judges to
respond to the crisis du jour and majoritarian sentiments. Prominent judges
and scholars have acknowledged the concerns or pressures on the federal
courts' role in controversies such as abortion issues or desegregation,23 but
one of the most important functions of a judge is to ensure that an individual
or entity's constitutional rights are protected against governmental
overreaching. Litigants must sometimes bring issues to courts precisely
because legislative or executive officials have ducked a controversy for fear
of retaliation at the polls. This role is particularly apt for those judges with
Article III protection.24 State judges are also often called upon to decide
controversial issues because other political actors do not want to take the
heat or because someone challenges state or local government action
(including direct-democracy measures in half the states), that are not crafted
carefully or implemented with sufficient regard to constitutional concerns.
Although they do not have as much protection as federal judges, state judges
also swear to uphold the law and are expected to act impartially to advance
the Constitution and applicable federal and state laws.
Finally, the Court has justified avoidance techniques because of the
"paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our system., 25 The
"paramount imp6rtance" of constitutional adjudication should lead to less
avoidance of constitutional issues by courts-not more. If courts do not
participate in the most important constitutional controversies of the day, the
polity would lose an important voice in constitutional dialogue within our
democratic framework.
Some of the Ashwander justifications contain faulty assumptions
about the delicacy and finality of judicial review. Fears that court rulings
will foreclose future legislative action are often excessive, although it is
admittedly hard to gauge the impact of constitutional rulings and account
thoroughly for all the pressure points that cause constitutional law to
change, even after the Court has issued an authoritative decision in the
area.26 Judicial review should be viewed through a long-term lens in which
23 See e.g. Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. Rev. 375 (1985); Hon. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review: A Practicing
Judge's Perspective, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 761 (2000); Posner, supra n. 7; Bickel, Least Dangerous
Branch, supra n. 7, at 111-98; Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 147 (Harvard U. Press
1993); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? (U. of
Chi. Press 1991).
24 Many federal judicial officers today do not have life tenure. See Judith Resnik, Trial as Error,
Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article Ill, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 924, 984-92
(2000).
25 Rescue Army v. Mun. Ct. of City ofL.A., 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
26 See e.g. Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law (3d ed., West
Publg. Co. 2001); Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577 (1993);
Hon. Robert A. Katzmann, Courts and Congress (Brookings Instn. Press 1997); Hon. Robert A.
Katzmann & Stephanie M. Herseth, An Experiment in Statutory Communication Between Courts
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constitutional adjudication and responsive debate-including constitutional
interpretation by the legislature, implementation by the executive, and
changes made by future courts-develop constitutional understandings over
time.
Relying on concerns about deference, foreclosure, and threats to
judicial independence, the U.S. Supreme Court has employed avoidance
techniques selectively over the past three decades, often in cases involving
controversial issues or "sensitive area[s] of social policy.' 27 The costs of
avoiding constitutional questions are borne too often by the poor and
marginalized in our society-those most in need of help in securing
protections for their constitutional rights and civil liberties. For example,
the Court has used avoidance techniques frequently in litigation involving
dissident speech (notably the Cold War cases), civil rights claims and issues
of equity for women, racial minorities, gays, lesbians, and cases involving
the protection of religious minorities.28 Sometimes the justices write overtly
about the political pressure on the courts; more often, the political
controversy goes unstated. The decision to avoid a constitutional issue is
itself a decision, and it is impossible to separate analysis of the procedural
tool completely from the merits of the underlying constitutional questions.
As judges determine whether it is necessary to address a constitutional issue,
their views of the merits are frequently intertwined with that decision.
Political pressure on courts may influence when courts issue minimalist
rulings, affording less clarity and guidance to other constitutional actors on
some of the most important issues of the day.
In contrast to its use of avoidance techniques in many areas
affecting various types of minorities, the Court has not been hesitant to
address other controversial constitutional issues. In its federalism rulings of
recent decades, the Court has refashioned a number of constitutional
doctrines to hold against victims of domestic violence, state workers
claiming discrimination, and those seeking to enforce intellectual property
rights against State entities. While the Rehnquist Court did not create a
vibrant body of equal protection law for those who are on the margins of our
society and still subject to serious discrimination, it did use equal protection
to intervene in the Bush v. Gore29 dispute despite a constitutional role set
forth in the Constitution for Congress in determining disputed elections.
Nevertheless, Congress and the public acquiesced, and some polling
indicates that the Court's credibility was not marred significantly by this
and Congress: A Progress Report, 85 Geo. L.J. 2189 (1997).
27 The designation comes from R.R. Com. ofTex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941).
28 For multiple examples of the Court's avoidance in recent decades of socially sensitive cases, see
generally Kloppenberg, Safe, supra n. 3. My assessment of avoidance patterns may be influenced
by my life experience as a woman and my faith's concern for the poor and marginalized. As other
scholars explore this area, a fuller picture of avoidance patterns will emerge, providing better
grounds for review and assessment of avoidance's benefits and costs.
29 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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activism. 3°
In summary, I have argued that courts should be more cautious in
their use of the avoidance canon. Such use may not promote deference to
the legislature or executive branch, depending on how the canon is deployed
and the nature of the clash between the branches. In particular, the Supreme
Court functions to interpret the Constitution and protect individual liberties
and minority interests and must sometimes repudiate the actions of other
federal branches. The concerns about the independence, credibility, and
viability of courts are overstated. Courts are quite resilient in our
democracy--even in the heat of war-and the cases canvassed below
provide a lens on this phenomenon.
III. AVOIDANCE FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR
While it is impossible to delineate every choice by the Court to
invoke (or ignore) avoidance techniques, one clear area of importance is the
Court's development of civil liberties during times of war. Phil Frickey has
praised the Warren Court's use of the canon during the McCarthy era.3'
Professor Frickey demonstrates that the early Warren Court used the
avoidance canon regularly in the 1950s to decide a series of cases involving
alleged Communist organizers and sympathizers at a "subconstitutional"
level, which sent warning signals to Congress while avoiding a more direct
clash.32 He argues that the Court used avoidance techniques to achieve
numerous objectives, including: defusing "political opposition while
incrementally adjusting public law to better respect individual liberty,"
shifting the "burden of overcoming legislative inertia" to other constitutional
actors, buying time for the Court to allow "political furor to subside" and
First Amendment and Due Process values to "reemerge in the general
consciousness," as well as allowing time for the Court's composition to
change and to move past a crisis.33 Professor Frickey concludes that "[t]he
rules of avoidance, putatively about judicial restraint and deference to
majoritarian political institutions, allowed the Court to play a game of high
stakes politics, to correct individual injustices in some circumstances, and to
protect its independence and future autonomy., 34  Thus, avoidance
techniques shored up the Court's credibility and power.
Professor Frickey assesses the prospect of direct constitutional
lawmaking as "dangerous" for the early Warren Court, which was
ideologically divided, affected by the Cold War, and feeling political
pressures due to the Brown v. Board of Education35 ruling. I have criticized
the Court's reliance on avoidance in the Lobbying Act cases of that era, as
30 Noah Feldmen, Who Can Check the President?, N.Y. Times Mag. § 6 at 56-57 (Jan. 8, 2006).
31 Frickey, supra n. 8.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 401.
3 Id.
" 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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well as the Communist membership and advocacy cases. I have argued that
the Court advanced subconstitutional norms that are not clearly demarcated
by precedent without providing constitutional guarantees in a way that did
not advance deference to Congress and delayed too long in enunciating
sufficient protection for the rights of those accused of Communist ties.36
For example, in 1951, the Court in Dennis v. US. upheld the convictions of
11 leaders of the Communist Party of the U.S. under the Smith Act for
conspiracy to advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government.37 Reading
the clear and present danger test broadly, the Court found organizing the
party and teaching Communist doctrines a sufficient threat in light of the
worldwide Communist danger. The Court refused to "paralyze our
Government ... in a semantic straight jacket., 38 By 1957, in Yates v. U.S.,
the Court used the avoidance canon to reverse the convictions of 14 lower-
level Communist Party leaders charged with conduct similar to the
defendants in Dennis.39 Dennis has never been overruled; instead, the Court
in Yates modified it without overruling it. It wasn't until 1969 that the Court
adopted the modem constitutional standard of protection for dissident
political speech.40
In the Lobbying Act cases, the Court relied on the canon to
completely eviscerate clear congressional intent, narrowing a statute to
curtail congressional investigations by finding a committee had exceeded its
delegated authority and upholding it a year later in that constrained form.4'
These rulings stalled some investigations, including those involving socialist
organization activities. The narrowed construction of the Act remained in
force as a matter of statutory interpretation from the mid-1950s until the
mid-i 990S.42
Of course it is difficult, if not impossible, to assess this in
hindsight,43 and the early Warren Court may have not shared Professor
Frickey's (and my) sense of the constitutional values on the speech and
associational issues. Did avoidance promote constitutional dialogue? Even
if the Court had ruled against the dissidents directly, the state of
constitutional law would have been improved, at least in terms of clarity.
Did the First Amendment and Due Process values need the delay and
avoidance to emerge or, as Professor Frickey suggests, "reemerge"? It is
not clear that the consensus before 1950 was the same as that of the late
1950s. Might a clear statement from the Court earlier, expressing concern
36 Kloppenberg, Constitutional Doubts, supra n. 4, at 54-90.
3341 U.S. 494 (1951).
I ld. at 508.
354 U.S. 298 (1957).
40 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
41 U.S. v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); U.S. v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954). These cases are
discussed extensively in Kloppenberg, Constitutional Doubts, supra n. 4, at 78-88.
42 See generally Kloppenberg, Constitutional Doubts, supra n. 4.
43 Martin H. Redish, The Logic of Persecution: Free Expression and the McCarthy Era 1-18
(Stanford University Press 2005).
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over some of Joe McCarthy's tactics, have helped build a different
consensus about the content of constitutional guarantees? If the Court had
issued a Brown-like ruling in the Cold War cases prior to Yates instead of
the Dennis-Yates strategic posturing, would the Court have withstood the
potential backlash? These questions remain pertinent today as we evaluate
the federal courts' role in the War on Terror. Professor Frickey has noted
some parallels between the Cold War era and the War on Terror, citing
federal officials' potential "unacceptable shortcuts around the rights of
citizens and aliens," the fact that alleged terrorists "bear the brunt of a public
hostility [is] reminiscent of that facing suspected Communists in the 1950s,"
and that "bold constitutional lawmaking protecting the rights of such
individuals may be unlikely" in the current atmosphere.44 He suggests that
the current Court might gain valuable insights from the avoidance decisions
of the Cold War era. 5 In another essay in this collection, Neal Devins
explores some differences between this era and the Cold War era and
concludes that use of the canon is not advisable for the Roberts Court.a
Even if current circumstances are perceived as being similar to the Cold
War era, I remain skeptical about the value of avoidance.
In June 2004, the Court decided three cases arising from the War on
Terror. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court faced the constitutional issue
directly and ruled 8-1 that a U.S. citizen apprehended abroad could not be
held indefinitely as an enemy combatant without sufficient safeguards
required by the Due Process Clause. 47 The Court found that the detainee
must be accorded a meaningful factual hearing without determining exactly
what that entailed in all details. It resolved the other two cases primarily on
nonconstitutional grounds, ruling 6-3 in Rasul v. Bush that Guantanamo Bay
detainees who are not U.S. citizens have rights to pursue habeas corpus
petitions in federal court.48 In Padilla v. Rumsfeld, the Court found that a
U.S. citizen, apprehended abroad and held as an enemy combatant in a
military jail within the U.S., had filed his habeas petition in the wrong
federal court district.4 9 A majority of the justices indicated, however, that
the government did not have authority to detain a U.S. citizen arrested
within the U.S. as an enemy combatant.5°
Two years later, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court ruled that the
4Frickey, supra n. 8, at 403.
45 Id. at 463 (referencing two recent cases involving deportation of aliens in which the Court
invoked the canon).
4See Neal Devins, Constitutional Avoidance and the Roberts Court, 32 U. Dayton L. Rev. 331
(2007).
47 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
4' 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
49 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
so Id. at 463 n. 8 (Stevens, J., dissenting) and Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Neil S. Siegel,
A theory in Search of a Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103




government "must comply with the Rule of Law" and found that certain
military tribunals created by executive order amounted to unconstitutional
overreaching by the President .5 The Court found that the executive action
violated the Geneva accords and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The
5-3 majority rejected the dissenters' concern that the Court's decision would
hamper the ability of the President to take executive action to deal
effectively with a deadly, "worldwide, hydra-headed enemy, who lurks in
the shadows conspiring to reproduce the atrocities of September 11, 2001 .,52
The concurring justices emphasized that "Congress has not issued the
Executive 'a blank check."'
53
Interestingly, the Hamdan Court refused several avenues for
avoidance. The Court found that it had jurisdiction, despite the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005, which had been passed after the Court granted
certiorari in the case.54 The Act restricted review of the decisions of military
tribunals concerning Guantanamo detainees to the D.C. Circuit. As a matter
of statutory construction, the Court found that Congress did not clearly
intend the restriction on jurisdiction to apply retroactively to pending cases,
including the current controversy. The Court also rejected the government's
abstention argument.55
While the War on Terror will produce other constitutional
questions, the Court employed a mix of statutory construction avoidance
techniques and direct constitutional rulings in this early set of cases. In
Hamdi and Hamdan, the Court issued some bold rulings on important issues
implicating the balance between protecting national security and protecting
the civil liberties of all persons, even those accused of terrorist activities.
The Court engaged in its lawsaying function, facing squarely controversial
constitutional issues during wartime, when political pressure on executive
and congressional leaders was heavy and the rights of suspected terrorists
could have easily been minimized. Despite its refusal to avoid important
constitutional issues in time of war, the Court has endured and the
constitutional dialogue is enriched as the scope of protection for detainees
has developed. Even if the Court had found that the President had not
exceeded his authority in Hamdan or that Due Process did not require other
processes in Hamdi, the polity is still better served by direct constitutional
interpretation rather than the delay and indirection that can result from
invocation of the avoidance canon.
Direct constitutional interpretation by the courts need not foreclose
long-term dialogue. The President can use his bully pulpit to foster public
opinion and can nominate Supreme Court justices and other federal judges
51 Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2749.
52 Id. at 2838 (quoting Thomas, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 2799 (quoting Breyer, J., concurring).
54 Id. at 2769.
" Id. at 2772.
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sensitive to the executive or congressional view of the balance of security
and liberty in an age of terrorism. In addition, Congress can pursue other
avenues to enhance national security if its legislation is stricken by the
Court, including passage of other legislation, hearings and political activities
designed to bring public attention to the matter.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts will never reject avoidance techniques completely; judges
need some flexibility in adjudication. The Rehnquist Court suggested that
federal courts should pause at the outset of a ruling and ask whether
addressing a constitutional question is truly necessary. Instead, courts
should reverse that presumption, considering carefully the cost of avoidance
to litigants and others before avoiding decision.56 Courts should also
examine whether the rationales for avoidance are promoted by deploying the
canon. Will deference and judicial independence truly be advanced? Even
if those values are advanced, courts should assess the costs of avoidance and
heed the courts' role in the constitutional scheme, including promotion of
constitutional dialogue over the long haul regardless of the heat of the
moment.
Justice Breyer, mindful of the primacy of legislative decision-
making, has asserted that emerging democratic societies need independent
judiciaries to help secure basic liberties:
[an] independent judiciary may protect them by helping
gradually to develop among citizens and legislators liberty-
protecting habits based in part upon their expectation that
liberty-infringing laws will turn out not to be laws. And
such protection might seem particularly necessary in a new
democracy or one with a highly diverse citizenry or sizeable
minority groups. That independent judiciary may also
protect through the kind of force ... that a court can bring
to bear when, faced with a law that clearly violates a
constitutional provision, that court says "no. 57
In many ways, his advice is sound for preserving judicial independence
and advancing constitutional dialogue in our democracy as well.
56 For more details on this proposed analysis, see Kloppenberg, Constitutional Doubts, supra n. 4,
at 90-93.
57 Hon. Stephen Breyer, supra n. 23 (emphasis added).
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